Update no.484

Update from the Heartland

No.484

21.3.11 – 27.3.11

Blog version: http://heartlandupdate.blogspot.com/

To all,
The follow-up news items:
-- Unfortunately, the tragedy of the Tohoku earthquake [482/3] has been vastly overshadowed and dominated by the crisis at the Fukushima power plant. Every piece of encouraging news seems to be followed by three steps back. I suspect the recovery from the tsunami will be well underway by the time the Fukushima situation is stabilized and under control.
More before & after satellite images of the tsunami destruction in Japan:
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/03/110316-zoom-satellite-pictures-japan-tsunami-earthquake-world-before-after/
and
http://www.abc.net.au/news/events/japan-quake-2011/beforeafter.htm

“Is it America’s duty to intervene wherever regime change is needed?”
by George F. Will
Washington Post
Published: Monday, March 21, 2011; 2:39 PM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/regime-change-in-libya-isnt-americas-duty/2011/03/21/ABhDlj7_story.html?wpisrc=nl_opinions
As much as I respect George Will’s writing style, I find myself disagreeing with him more often than not; here is yet one more example. If he switched Bush for Obama and Iraq for Libya eight years ago, I might have agreed with him just a little bit more. This incessant, mindless, irrational drivel that the other side can absolutely, categorically, unequivocally, never ever do anything correctly. We endured this foolish mindset during the last administration and we must continue to endure the flip-flop version for this administration. To answer George’s title question, NO! Yet, the administration opens itself to this type of criticism when we intervene in Libya but not Yemen, or Dubai, or Syria, et al. As I wrote last week [483], I think the United States was a reluctant partner with our European allies. I would have no problem with the United States providing support to the French and British, or NATO, with aerial refueling, AWACS and such, but injecting this country in another civil war in a Muslim country is not what we need. Nonetheless, we are in it, so let’s get ‘er done.

Aslan Soobzokov sent his official reply submittal to the government’s motion to dismiss [479] his petition for a Writ of Mandamus [474]. The next step should be a hearing before U.S. Senior District Judge Dickinson Richards Debevoise of New Jersey. Once again, I laud Aslan’s passionate and vigorous effort to seek justice from the assassination of his father in 1985. The court shall determine the merits of his petition under the law. Aslan alleges the government closed his father’s murder case for political reasons, contrary to established criminal law. He also claims the government has sufficient evidence to identify, extradite and try the perpetrators of his father’s murder. Above the legal arguments, I am struck repeatedly by the government’s misconduct in this case all stemming from the original, baseless accusations that Tscherim Soobzokov was a Nazi war criminal. I have seen no evidence in any government document or otherwise that even remotely suggests Tscherim engaged in any criminal conduct. At worst, he might be guilty by association . . . an association for survival rather than persecution of anyone. He admittedly supported the Germans in Circassia as they were against the Soviet communist occupiers of his homeland. We may be suspicious of anyone who associated with the Waffen-SS during World War II, but that is a very long way from any criminal conduct. Tscherim Soobzokov was illuminated by the U.S. Government, which in turn inflamed radical, militant, Jewish, revenge groups to take justice into their hands. Terrorism is wrong for any reason. Good luck, Aslan.

“The mind-set that survived the Triangle Shirtwaist fire”
by Harold Meyerson
Washington Post
Published: Tuesday, March 22, 2011; 7:06 PM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-mind-set-that-survived-the-triangle-shirtwaist-fire/2011/03/22/ABh20rEB_story.html?wpisrc=nl_opinions
OK, enough already! I acknowledge, understand and appreciate that unions, i.e., organized labor, collective bargaining units, are really angry over the strong-arm tactics utilized by Governor Walker of Wisconsin [482] and the state’s legislature to seriously curtail the collective bargaining privileges of state employee unions. But, comparing the current public / political debate on state employee unions to the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory in New York City (25.March.1911) . . . really?!?
A century ago, union organizing can be argued as an essential action in the development of fair labor practices, workplace safety, and respect for the common laborer. I use the word “essential” with purpose, intention and directness. Labor practices utilized by the owners and operators of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory were at best barbaric in virtually every aspect of modern workplace expectations – sweat shops in the worst context. Those abusive labor practices led directly to the deaths of 146 women and men. The event became the catalyst and rallying point for the union movement. There is no debate that the union movement was an important, necessary, essential element in the evolution of this Grand Republic. The process brought bloody, hard-fought respect for the common laborer and even skilled workers. Unions began in a staunchly adversarial role and simply never matured as business did. As with any system, stability depends upon balance. This recession and especially the Wisconsin labor crisis brightly illuminated the imbalance in the American labor movement. Unions in companies with a profit motive are one thing; unions with a government that has no profit motive is all together another issue. Instead of helping governments balance their budgets or companies remain profitable, unions persist in the me-me-me mentality that has gotten us to this situation. Hopefully, the Wisconsin experience will help unions transform themselves into becoming part of the solution rather than part of the problem.

Comments and contributions from Update no.483:
Comment to the Blog:
“I note that you support the continuation of both nuclear power generation and deepwater fossil fuel extraction, but you do not state whether you support the well-being of the public, the planet, and the corporations concerned. Particular methods of drilling wells and specific nuclear waste containment methods have failed dramatically; other operations continue using the same methods. Specifically, should we allow conditions that have proven to be horribly dangerous to continue during the time it takes to ‘learn from mistakes and accidents’?
“So now we have a third military front, but we still have no quantifiable goal in any of them. I support the idea of winning or staying out, but we still need to define winning clearly and decide what price is too high.
“I rejoice that Egypt has held elections. Whether the Muslim Brotherhood prospers and the results if they do prosper remain to be seen. I find it difficult to believe that Hosni Mubarak's party will do well regardless of its organizational abilities.”
My response to the Blog:
I acknowledge the seriousness of your first statement, but I must confess the suffering of a modest chuckle. If we did not know each other so well, I might think your picture me as the heartless, curmudgeon troll from under the bridge. You know quite well my compassion for mankind, concern and care for the planet, and my inherent suspicion of the corporate profit motive. As with all human endeavors, progress is often borne on the sacrifice of a hapless few – bridges, buildings, railroads, ships, airplanes, mining, industrialization, ad infinitum. History is replete with mistakes. The reality is, we learn far more from the mistakes than we do from the successes; this is NOT rationalization for any loss of life or injury at the altar of progress – quite the contrary. The learning process from the Macondo Well disaster continues; I firmly believe we will be better for the event. Likewise, we shall learn and become smarter from the Fukushima disaster. I’ve been amazed (so far) that the contamination from Fukushima has been so low considering the magnitude and breadth of what apparently happened to cause the event. Nuclear power generation remains the cleanest, least offensive source of large scale electricity generation. Even hydroelectric systems compromise large tracts of land . . . with the exception of those few that utilize natural waterfalls. When properly stored, spent fuel rods are safe and can be maintained so for generations . . . until we figure out how we might reuse them. The storage pools as used at Fukushima were intended to be temporary, transient capacity, not virtually permanent sites because of the NIMBY syndrome. We want and need electric power, but we do NOT want the facilities that generate that power – what a dichotomy that is.
Re: Libya. I suspect in this instance the United States was a reluctant partner. My compassion sympathizes with the protesters trying to rid themselves of a tyrannical dictator; however, definition of the national interests of the United States in Libya would be tortuous at best. The definition of “winning” is not clear to me either. While the Libyan action may seem humanitarian, these events have a consistent way of experiencing scope-creep, no matter the noble contrary intentions. My opinion about the employment of military half-measures is well-documented and clear; my opinion has not changed. This was a bad idea, but the trigger was pulled and we’re all-in now.
You may well be correct on the Egyptian political terrain. I certainly hope not. As always, we shall see soon enough, and there is a very real potential that Egypt could be another “be careful what you wish for” episode like Iran was in 1979.
. . . round two:
“Indeed it is. The question is how we go about learning. If we continue to operate in the same way that brought us those mistakes, we will get the same results. Put more simply, if you always do what you always did, you will always get what you always got. It seems to me that we ought to refrain from taking the same risks; we already know the results. We should resume such operations only when we have different equipment or methods that offer a reasonable expectation of safer operation.
“Despite the incredible scope of the Macondo/Deepwater Horizon disaster, spent fuel rods may pose more of a threat in the long run, depending on how many of them are created. The fact that nobody wants something that dangerous located near them ought to be a clue to the planners who would gladly risk someone else's well-being on what they claim is a low risk. NIMBY exists for good reasons. That nuclear-power idea has sold better in Japan than here, and we see the results. Nuclear power will only be the ‘cleanest, least offensive’ source of electricity after this issue is resolved.
“As far as Libya, I certainly agree that the trigger has been pulled, but I don't see how that obliges us to continue. What American interests do we risk by pulling out? I understand that part of NATO wants us to do the job for them, but other parts do not. We were not obligated to take this on. We have done so anyhow, and Obama and the military claim that we will hand off leadership in ‘days, not weeks,’ but nobody else has volunteered for the job. If we're suckers enough to take the losses, why would they?”
. . . my response to round two:
In the aviation biz, we have always walked a very fine line seeking balance between safety, performance, cost, productivity, and even aesthetics. For decades, we have employed processes to continuously and rigorously assess system safety. Our objective is zero accidents. Yet, as we continue to witness accidents (e.g., AF447, QF32, BA38, et al), we continue to learn more. Case in point, we are flying higher and longer than a generation ago; we are learning of an atmospheric phenomenon commonly called ice crystal impaction, which describes a series of peculiar events; the atmosphere hasn’t changed, but our interaction has changed. We try to eliminate / minimize all the known risks, but unknown-unknowns present surprises.
You are of course quite correct. Oil components deteriorate fairly rapidly. Nuclear fuel rods do not. Yet, they can and are stored safely in a proper facility. A temporary holding pool is NOT a proper facility. The Yucca Mountain facility is a proper site, but folks do not want containers transported through their city, despite the fact that the containers a nuclear-hardened. Yes, there is risk with nuclear energy; however, the public reaction is highly emotional, rather than rational. We accept the risks of driving an automobile or flying in an airplane, but we turn freaky when someone mentions nuclear or radiation. Frankly, I am fairly comfortable with nuclear stuff; it is the chemical & biological agents that scare the hell outta me. We shall respectfully disagree it seems . . . I believe nuclear has been, is, and will remain the “cleanest, least offensive” source of electricity generation for a long time. Let’s improve it, rather than discard it.
As the Press continues to dig, it appears the Fukushima facility violated more than a few existing safety regulations, which in turn suggests government oversight was lax, complacent, or perhaps even complicit. In a feeble attempt to keep things in perspective, if the Fukushima reactors had been typical Soviet types like at Chernobyl, rather than Western (albeit older GE designs), we would have a far more serious situation.
Re: Libya. You make good and valid points. I share your concerns. I am not sure this is yet a NATO operation. I believe France, UK, U.S., and others are acting by coalition under UNSC Res.1973, rather than as NATO or some other entity. I hope the President is correct when he says “days, not weeks,” but I trust he will forgive me for being skeptical. I found it refreshing that France made the first manned strike . . . at least by what has been made public so far. The reality is, the President was going to be hammered no matter what he did, even if he did nothing. This is the first time he has pulled the trigger on a major operation . . . rather than carry on the fight of his predecessor.
. . . round three:
“As I'm sure you know, the aviation industry accepts close attention from government regulators. If need be, a particular model of plane can be grounded pending replacement of a defective part. Were it appropriate, I imagine a particular brand of aircraft or company fleet could be stopped until some issue had been resolved. That does not apply to any part of the energy industry or to very many others.
“You note that the public response to nuclear transportation and storage is ‘highly emotional rather than rational.’ So is the engineers' reaction to NIMBY. Engineers forget that their work is based on assumptions. Thus, they assume that safety systems on deepwater drilling rigs will not be ignored or shut down, as most were on the Deepwater Horizon. See Disaster on the Horizon, by Bob Cavnar (ISBN 9781603583169) for a good book-length discussion of the influence of attitudes in real-world results. He discusses only the petroleum industry, but his experience and research could extend to pretty much anything operated by humans. In the case of nuclear waste, designers and engineers assume that each person involved in handling it will exercise the same caution and insight that they believe they themselves would use. The public knows better, based on experience including but not limited to the Deepwater Horizon incident. We also know that the long-term results of a Yucca Flats storage facility cannot be accurately predicted. Time and again, new information catches scientists and engineers by surprise.
“On top of that, if the bright and capable terrorists envisioned by the Department of Homeland Insecurity really exist, they will find a way to hijack a shipment or two and hold the country hostage or whatever else they would do with such a weapon.
“Yes, we do take risks such as driving or flying. Those risks are considered, voluntary, and bring specific benefits that, by and large, we cannot achieve effectively by other means. Energy needs can be met by other means. Even coal looks good in the light of Fukushima.”
. . . my response to round three:
First, Re: regulation. Indeed, and well stated! The reason for that acceptance of regulation is the passenger – innocent, passive, human beings at the mercy of the machine, its operators and the environment.
Second, “Engineers forget that their work is based on assumptions.” I shall fundamentally and categorically disagree. I neither know nor am I aware of any engineer, in any country, in any sector, who forgets or ignores assumptions. Engineering is a process that begins with assumptions, is constructed to replace assumptions with the best facts available, and assesses and mitigates the risks associated with those assumptions that remain. Engineering is not and never will be a perfect process. As noted earlier, from that reality, we learn from failures based on a myriad of root cause factors.
Third, you are quite correct in your observations of the aviation industry. We have strict configuration management processes that define, record and exercise control over the design of every licensed aircraft. Aviation also has a rigorous process of system safety assessment that applies redundancy, greater margins, or other protections against failure; so does the nuclear power industry as well. Engineering also strives to ensure human operators have the best information available for the safe operation of any machine, especially where passengers are involved.
I have read more than a few accident reports, mostly aircraft, but also notably the assessment of the Chernobyl accident and recently the Macondo Well accident (among many others). Focusing on the latter, I read both the company and government reports in their entirety. I was struck by a phenomenon common to the operation of any machine – situation awareness.
As computer-processing technology expanded and became practical for application to operating machines in the 1970’s, engineers utilized computer processing and advanced display technology to give operators better situational awareness and predictive information. Such technology was applied to the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig. As graphically illuminated in the company report, the information displayed to the operators that day/night was not integrated or predictive; that was left to the human operators. As the blowout began, there were signs, but those signs were confusing and not clear (un-integrated). As the event progressed, events accelerated rapidly to the point of no return. Yet, as I read both main reports, one singular grievous mistake stood out – the failure to divert the riser contents to the overboard vent before the oil & gas reached the surface.
We have yet to see even a preliminary technical assessment of the Fukushima accident. Based on the available Press and public information, my hypothesis is the facility withstood the earthquake with little to no damage, but the tsunami overwhelmed all protections, took out the electrical controls of the primary and both alternate coolant systems, which in turn sent the operating reactors into thermal overload. In addition to struggling with the thermal situation, they have been trying to restore electrical power to one or more of the coolant systems.
There is no such thing as a perfect system – never has been, never will be. There is the best system we can design, build and operate with the knowledge we have. Such recognized uncertainty should never stop us from making the effort. Airplanes today are far safer than airplanes built 50 years ago; so it is with virtually every machine including nuclear reactors; but, that does not make 50yo reactors unsafe either.
Re: Yucca Flats (or equivalent). The site and facility are orders of magnitude better than any reactor facility holding pond; I believe is it the best such facility on Earth. The future of the Earth cannot be accurately predicted. So, what standard level of predictability are we going to hold ourselves? Are we asking for vastly greater accuracy and assurance than we can achieve for any other safety / security system? If so, is that reasonable?
Likewise, there is no such thing as perfect security. In the special ops world, an axiom of operations remains, where there’s a will, there’s a way. There are reasonably safe methods for transportation of high-value materials like spent fuel. Could the scenario you describe happen? Yes, absolutely. I trust the government to properly prepare for and execute such transport plans, and I truly hope and expect those plans and processes to be highly classified, under a strict, confined, need to know.
Shutting down nuclear power facilities is NOT the answer. Nuclear power, electricity generation brings enormous benefit at relatively low risk and cost. Nonetheless, let us assume we shutdown every single nuclear reactor in the world. What could replace that lost capacity? Coal? Then, the global-warming environmentalists scream bloody murder; they want to shutdown existing coal plants. Wind? Classic NIMBY . . . don’t want to see those huge windmills; plus, takes a lot of wind turbines and constant wind to replace just one reactor. Solar? Vast tracts of land needed to collect equivalent power. What then?
I recognize there are no easy answers. I would prefer an electricity generation source that is renewable, clean, without risk, easily camouflaged, and presents no environmental stress. Unfortunately, that technology does not yet exist. Until then, I see nuclear energy as the best solution.
. . . round four:
“Your response reinforces my point about engineers responding from emotion. Of course engineers remember the assumptions. I never said they didn't. My point was that engineering assumptions may not match reality, especially assumptions about people's behavior. History at least back to the sinking of the Titanic supports that statement.
“I am not engineer enough to understand the technical reports on the incident, nor would I find them as interesting as you would. What I do know is that the bulk of the safety systems on the Deepwater Horizon were turned off or ignored. That is what I mean by assumptions not matching reality. The people who designed and built that rig assumed that the safety systems would be used as the engineers believed they themselves would use the systems. They designed the systems and procedures according to that assumption, but it did not work in reality. Designers and engineers know much about mechanical topics, but little about human beings. For example, more than one of my business courses describe scrupulous following of every procedure as a form of worker sabotage. That appears to have been the managers' opinion on the Deepwater Horizon. Studies of the Three Mile Island incident include that as a factor also. Study human disasters as far back as records go. In nearly all of them, the systems would have functioned but for the humans failing to use them or using them poorly. When I discuss ‘human factors,’ I mean a great deal more than the organization of readouts.
“The aviation industry differs from most others in that regulators have immediate access to the entire industry. Other industries do not have that level of regulation.
“No assessment of the Fukushima incident, technical or otherwise, is yet available. My point comes back again to the assumptions. The assumption that spent fuel could be stored in ponds until some other method of storage could be found has failed dramatically. Should governments allow that same assumption to be used elsewhere?
“Given the seriousness of failures, why would we not have extremely high requirements for nuclear material storage? If we add terrorism to the other risks of transportation, why would we allow that? You are certainly right in saying that there is no perfect security. Imperfect security is too risky if it's my country we're talking about. I have no idea how you can state that nuclear power generation carries a low risk. Fukushima, Chernobyl, and Three Mile Island illustrate the problem with that statement. The results of failures make any risk whatever very important.”
. . . my response to round four:
My oh my, your words suggest a very low opinion of engineers. We are not as bad as you make us appear . . . as rather limited intellectually and not particularly contributive citizens. Nonetheless . . .
Re: “My point was that engineering assumptions may not match reality, especially assumptions about people's behavior.” What can I say? Again, I know of no engineer on the planet who does not seek reconciliation of every single assumption. We do the best we can within boundaries of human perception. We can always do better. How good is good enough?
Perhaps we are confusing the words “assumptions” and “requirements.” The former is an unknown; the latter is a known. Requirements are established during the preliminary design process. The engineering process designs a facility to withstand at 9.0 earthquake – that is a design requirement, not an assumption. Engineering uses the best available data regarding what is involved in a 9.0 earthquake to design the structure. Further, such a design is expected to withstand a 9.0 earthquake with no structural damage. Structural loads are defined by those requirements. Engineers invariably apply margins based on the uncertainty of the applied loads, thus structures can withstand loads above the design loads. We can design structures to withstand any load, but then the question is should we? Structural design loads must be balanced with cost, risk, consequences, and many other factors. We cannot afford to build to infinite loads. It is all about balance.
Re: “Designers and engineers know much about mechanical topics, but little about human beings.” Yes, engineers can calculate stress and strength of materials, kinematics, et cetera. However, again, I must respectfully disagree. Human Factors Engineering has been an established and important discipline for 40 years. Providing human operators essential information to control a machine safely and properly is a fundamental requirement. No matter how much we study and how hard we try, nothing is ever perfect, nor will it ever be.
Procedures only work so far, but they are the intended process for operating any machine. Systems are designed for normal as well as several levels of emergency operations. Once an event is beyond those procedures and processes, human operators must adapt to what they perceive of the situation they face. The operators of Fukushima are well beyond the design-operating environment, and I’m sure they are doing their best to regain control.
Re: “The assumption that spent fuel could be stored in ponds until some other method of storage could be found has failed dramatically.” I do not know with certainty, but I’ll bet that long-term storage of spent fuel rods in temporary on-site pools was NEVER an assumption – not in Japan, not in the United States, not anywhere. My understanding is spent fuel in those pools is a de facto reality imposed by the inability of government’s to agree upon a proper permanent storage facility, e.g., Yucca Mountain. Various governments including the United States and apparently Japan have not fulfilled their responsibility of providing secure, long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel rods.
Re: “high requirements.” I believe you will find the nuclear industry requirements are the highest on the planet. In my humble opinion, the weakness is the failure of the government to provide a secure, permanent, storage facility. The electric power generation industry is doing the best they can within the constraints imposed upon them by government regulatory agencies. The situation in Fukushima is not as simple as it may seem.

My very best wishes to all. Take care of yourselves and each other.
Cheers,
Cap :-)